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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1956
The implications of the instant case present questions that can only
be answered by future litigation. The protection afforded by the public
hospital immunity statute seems to have been broadened, but whether
it will protect a hospital district from an action based on an absolute
liability theory, such as breach of warranty where no negligence is
alleged, remains to be seen.
Another problem would be presented to the court if a case should
arise involving a cause of action against a hospital or blood bank based
on an injury resulting from the transfusion of contaminated or diseased
blood. If the entire facts of the transaction were before the court for
consideration, it seems highly questionable that the court would uphold
their decision that the supplying of blood is not a sale.
CLARK B. SnuRE
TAXATION
Inheritance Tax-Resident Vendor's Interest in Foreign Lands
as Within Taxing Jurisdiction. In re Plasterer's Estate' upheld the
power of the State of Washington to levy an inheritance tax upon a
deceased resident's interest in Alaska lands held under partially
executory contracts of sale.
At the time of testatrix' death she was a resident of Washington,
and held title to three parcels of Alaska land which she had contracted
to sell. Her Alaska executrix paid inheritance taxes to the Territory
of Alaska upon the value of these lands. Ancillary proceedings having
determined the amount due to testatrix under these contracts for sale,
the State of Washington claimed that the value of testatrix' contract
interest in these lands was also subject to the Washington inheritance
tax, pursuant to RCW 83.04.
In order to reach this decision it was necessary for the court to find
the decedent's property interest to be within the taxing jurisdiction
of the state. - Considered as Alaska realty, it definitely was not.' The
1 149 Wash. Dec. 333, 301 P.2d 539 (1956).
2 RCW 83.04.010 provides in part:
All property within the jurisdiction of this state, and any interest therein,
whether belonging to the inhabitants of this state or not, and whether tangible
or intangible, which shall pass by will or by the statutes of inheritance of this
or any other state... shall, for the use of the state, be subject to a tax measured
by the full value of the entire property...
RCW 83.04.030, concerning property outside the state, provides that property
"...subject to, the jurisdiction of the [Washington courts] for distribution pur-
poses..." is to be subject to the inheritance tax.
'RCW 83.04.030 expressly excepts from the inheritance tax "real property located
outside the state passing in fee from the decendent owner ... ." The same result would
be reached in case law, under constitutional considerations. See Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937).
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Washington court, however, looked at this interest not as realty but
in terms of the partially executory contracts for sale which gave the
deceased a vendor's interest in the lands. This vendor's interest con-
sisted of the right to receive payment for the lands, and was classified
as a chose in action. Under the rule that intangible personal property
has its situs at the domicile of the owner (mobilia sequuntur per-
sonam)," the court found the deceased's interest to be within the taxing
jurisdiction of the state.
The court cited and relied upon the case of In re Eilermann's
Estate,5 which presented a fact situation the exact converse of the
present case. In that decision the decedent was a New Jersey resident
who held Washington land under an executory contract of sale. The
Washington court held that
Clearly, the interest of a nonresident vendor in a contract for the sale
of land situated in another state is intangible personal property. That
being so, it logically follows that the vendor's interest is taxable in the
state of the owner's domicile, not in the state wherein the land lies.6
The court thus denied its jurisdiction to levy an inheritance tax upon
the nonresident vendor's interest in the Washington lands.
The same reasoning was used in the present case, the factual differ-
ence being that the decedent was a Washington resident while her
lands were outside the state. Due to the converse fact situations,
opposite results were reached in these two cases. The pattern, how-
ever, is consistent: the vendor's interest is treated as personal prop-
erty and taxed at the vendor's domicile.
This pattern, in cases such as the present one, can lead to double
taxation, when both the state of the land's situs and the state of the
vendor's domicile levy inheritance taxes upon the interests which, by
conflicting arguments, they find to be within their respective jurisdic-
tions. By a similar conflict of laws, it is possible that both states could
disclaim their jurisdiction and leave the vendor's interest completely
untaxed.7 That such inconsistent results could be reached under the
pattern established by the Plasterer and Eilermann cases should not
be a fatal objection. The jurisdictions are in fact split upon this prob-
lem of the taxable interest of the nonresident vendor, some reaching
the same result that Washington has reached, and some, on the other
4 Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1 (1928); In re Lyons' Estate, 175 Wash. 115, 26
P.2d 615 (1933) ; In re Ellis' Estate, 169 Wash. 581, 14 P.2d 37, 86 A.L.R. 734 (1932).
5 179 Wash. 15, 35 P.2d 763 (1934).6 Id. at 19, 35 P.2d at 765.
7 This appears to have been the result in the Eilernann case.
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hand, simply taxing the land as realty when it is within the state and
exempting it when it is not.' In many states where case authority is
lacking, such considerations may turn on varying statutes or tax com-
mission policies. To expect Washington to formulate a consistent rule
which would prevent such cases of double taxation or, in the alterna-
tive, no taxation at all, would be to ask the impossible. It should be
noted, as did the court in the present case, that there is no constitu-
tional immunity against double taxation.'
The state, in arguing for the holding that the court adopted in the
Plasterer case, advanced two supporting theories: (1) that the execu-
tory contract for sale of the Alaska lands worked an equitable con-
version, and (2) that the contract rights of the decedent vendor
constituted a chose in action.10 Either line of reasoning would have
lead to the conclusion that the decedent's interest in the Alaska lands
was to be considered as personal property having its situs at the
decedent's domicile in Washington, and thus subject to the Washing-
ton inheritance tax. The theories were offered in the alternative, but
it is submitted that they are not mutually inconsistent.
The doctrine of equitable conversion by contract is based upon
the rights of the parties to an executory contract for sale of land,
as defined by the remedies available in a court of equity. After the
contract is executed, the purchaser has the right to an action for
specific performance of the promised conveyance of land, all condi-
tions being met, while the vendor has the right to receive the purchase
price. Since equity considers as done that which ought to be done,
the purchaser's true right is thus considered to be his right in the land,
and the vendor's right a right to the price. By the creation of the con-
tract, it is said, the purchaser's interest is equitably converted into
realty, and the vendor's interest into personalty."
The contract vendor of land has two interests: first, a fee interest
in the land, and, second, a contract right to the balance of the purchase
price. The doctrine of equitable conversion would operate upon the
first interest and convert it to personalty. The court, however, chose
to focus its attention solely upon the contract right of the deceased
vendor. The personal property interest thus found in the vendor is
S See Annot., 78 A.L.R. 793 (1932).
11 State Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942); Curry v. McCan-
less, 307 U.S. 357 (1939); Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189 (1903); Coe v. Town of
Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
10 Reply Brief for Appellant, p. 15, 149 Wash. Dec. 333, 301 P2d 539 (1956).
"' Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract, 13 CoLum. L. Rav. 369 (1913).
19571
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
quite consistent with the doctrine of equitable conversion by contract;
it is also logically independent of that doctrine. The contract right
could have been successfully sustained whether or not it was assumed
that the vendor's interest in realty was equitably converted into per-
sonalty by the contract. In real estate transactions the contract rights
of the parties are the basis upon which equitable conversion rests;
these contract rights are the cause, and not the effect, of the equitable
conversion. In the present case, therefore, when the court found the
contract right to payment in the vendor, and found it to be personalty
within the taxing jurisdiction, it had reached a point where further
argument concerning equitable conversion was completely unnecessary
to the decision reached.
In reaching this decision by use of contract theory only, the court
by-passed the necessity for basing the decision on any equitable owner-
ship in the purchaser. The same decision could have been reached in
a jurisdiction that completely denies any equitable interest in real
estate to the purchaser under an executory contract. Washington, it
may be noted, has a recorded case, Ashford v. Reese, 2 which does deny
any equitable (or legal) interest in land to such a purchaser, in effect
rejecting the entire doctrine of equitable ownership.' It is a unique
holding, unmatched in any other jurisdiction, and is completely out
of step with the great body of Anglo-Saxon property law. It is sub-
mitted that the Washington court today need not, and does not, fear
any conflict with the Ashford v. Reese doctrine. The logical implica-
tions of that doctrine have been rejected in subsequent Washington
cases, 4 and the court has given clear indications that, although never
expressly overruled, Ashford v. Reese, to the extent that it denies
equitable ownership, is no longer the law of Washington."
While the court has avoided the doctrine of equitable conversion
12 132 Wash. 649, 233 Pac. 29 (1925).
13 This case has been commented upon in several instances in the Washington Law
Review. See Lichty, Rights and Estates of Vendor and Vendee Under an Executory
Contract for the Sale of Real Property, 1 WASH. L. REv. 9 (1925); Schweppe, Rights
of a Vendee Under an Executory Forfeitable Contract for the Purchase of Real
Estate: A Further Word on the Washington Law, 2 WASir. L. REv. 1 (1926); Lantz,
Rights of Vendees Under Executory Contracts of Sale, 3 WAsH. L. REv. 1 (1928).
14 Comment, 22 WAsH. L. Rr-v. 110 (1947).
15 See Griffith v. Whittier, 37 Wn2d 351, 353, 223 P.2d 1062, 1063 (1950), wherein
the opinion stated,
Whatever we may have meant by our unfortunate choice of language in Ashford
v. Reese, supra, it is now abundantly clear that the purchaser under an execu-
tory contract has a valid and subsisting interest in property that is the subject
matter of (such a) contract.
See also Eckley v. Bonded Adjustment Co., 30 Wn2d 96, 190 P.2d 718 (1948);
In re Levaq' Estate, 33 Wn2d 530, 540, 206 P2d 482, 488 (1949) (concurring opin-
ion by HILL, J.).
[SUMMER
WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1956
in the present case, as an explanation of how the vendor's interest
becomes personal property, that type of reasoning can be seen in
the earlier Eilermann case when it handled the same issue. That case
held that
... a vendor's interest under an executory contract for the sale of land
should be treated as personalty for the purpose of administration. 6
(emphasis added)
This language suggests a realization by the writer of that opinion of
the fictional nature of the concept used; it apparently is intended to
be the language of equitable conversion, although it was never specified
as such, perhaps in deference to the prior language of the court in
Ashford v. Reese.
Applying equitable conversion in the present case, however, would
have entangled the court in particular logical difficulties. It is a rule
of conflicts of laws that whether realty is equitably converted into
personalty would be a question to be determined by the jurisdiction in
which the land lies." This rule gave no difficulty in the Eilermann
case where the lands in issue were in Washington; in cases such as
the present, however, where the lands in issue lie outside Washing-
ton, the decision would be logically dependent upon the law of the
foreign jurisdiction. The conflict of law thus created would preclude
Washington's uniform classification of property rights for the pur-
pose of its own state taxation; this result, if ever reached, would be
unfortunate indeed. It might be questioned whether the court, by
avoiding the equitable conversion argument, has actually circumvented
this logical pitfall, or whether it has simply ignored it. The answer
to this question depends upon whether or not the contract rights
theory used in the present decision depends upon the doctrine of
equitable conversion. It has already been argued above that it does
not depend upon that doctrine. Therefore it follows that the court
has properly avoided the application of this rule of conflicts.
If, as is here submitted, the Washington court has found a logical
means of classifying for taxation purposes the vendor's interest in an
executory real estate contract as personal property without resort to
the doctrine of equitable conversion, it is a logical possibility that the
state might levy such a tax upon a resident vendor's interest, as in the
present case, and also, by denying the doctrine of equitable conver-
16 179 Wash. at 18, 35 P2d at 765.
"7Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900); RESTATMENT, CoNLicT OF LAWS § 209(1934); 2 BwE, ComNLxcr op LAWS § 209.1 (1935); See Annot., 43 A.L.R2d 569,
576 (1955).
19571
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
sion, levy another such tax upon the land itself when it lies within the
state. Theoretically this is possible, but it is an unreasonable result
and should not be expected. The Eilermann case stands as a clear
indication that the court will invoke the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion in substance if not in name, in just such a case as this; it stands
as good authority that the court will deny the state's power to tax the
land itself after the title holder has made a contract to sell it.
The use of legal fictions, such as equitable conversion, in applica-
tion to matters of taxation has been disapproved in numerous juris-
dictions. The policy behind such disapproval is that taxation is a
matter of eminently practical importance and that taxes should be
levied upon realities, not upon fictions.18 On this basis it would be
possible to frame a criticism of the Plasterer case. Actually the
deceased vendor's interest, a combination of land and the contract to
sell it, did include an interest in real estate. Granting that by the
contract the vendor did transfer away the full beneficial ownership,
according to the standard theory of the vendor-purchaser relationship,
still that transfer remained subject to defeasance. Such defeasance
would take place, under the forfeiture clauses common to real estate
contracts today, 9 upon default of the purchaser's contract payments
and foreclosure by the vendor. It could thus be argued that, in fact,
the decedent did hold an interest in Alaska realty and that that prop-
erty should have been taxed only in Alaska. A possible rebuttal to
this argument might be that, once the contract for sale is made, the
contract rights are, for practical purposes, of somewhat greater value
than the fee interest remaining in the vendor, even though there
remains the possibility of default of the purchaser and the fore-
closure of his equities.
It is submitted, however, that the Washington court, in the Plasterer
and Eilermann cases, has reached a uniform rule that the vendor's
interest in an executory real estate contract is personal property and
will be taxed at the domicile of the vendor only. The court has devel-
oped the logical tools to support this rule in all situations, and it may
be expected that future decisions on this problem will be consistent
with the results and reasoning of these two cases.
RoBERT T. CARTER
28 See Connell v. Crosby, 210 Ill. 380, 71 N.E. 350 (1904); McCurdy v. McCurdy,
197 Mass. 248, 83 N.E. 881 (1908) ; State v. Fusting, 134 Md. 349, 106 A. 690 (1919) ;
In re Swift's Estate, 137 N.. 77, 32 N.E. 1096 (1893); In re Wolcott's Estate, 157 N.Y.
Supp. 268 (1916) ; Latta v. Jenkins, 200 N.C. 255, 156 S.E. 857 (1931).
19 And present in the contract involved in the present case.
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